Busan Port’s LNG and Methanol Plan: Who Pays to Keep Fuel Ready?

Busan is already supplying ships with LNG and methanol, drawing on a fuel network that extends beyond the port. A new energy terminal planned for 2032 is intended to improve supply security. Its economic test is whether closer storage can deliver a service that shipping lines will pay enough to sustain.

The Seaspan Amazon took on 3,000 metric tons of biomethanol at a shipyard on Shanghai's Changxing Island between August 31 and September 1, 2026. Just over a month later, the same container ship received another delivery in Busan, where bunkering took place alongside other ship and port operations. The Shanghai transfer was carried out by SIPG Energy's Haigang Zhiyuan. The fuel supplied at Busan came from Goldwind's production network in China, according to Hapag-Lloyd, which operates the ship.

The quantity delivered in Busan was not disclosed. Nor were the prices or handling charges at either location. The operations cannot be compared as competing bids for an identical order: one took place during a shipyard call, the other at a working container port. Together, however, they capture the market Busan is entering. A vessel converted to burn methanol can obtain it at more than one port, through different arrangements, as its route and maintenance schedule permit. Converting the engine makes a customer possible. It does not make that customer captive.

Busan has already done more than receive a shipment. In October 2024, a vessel operated by Busan-based Hyodong Shipping transferred approximately 3,000 tons of methanol to the Antonia Maersk at Busan New Port's PNC terminal. Container handling continued throughout the operation, which lasted about 11 hours. Korean Register, headquartered in Busan, helped develop the safety procedures. Bringing a fuel vessel alongside a container ship, managing the transfer of methanol and keeping terminal work moving demanded a set of specialized services that a storage tank by itself cannot provide.

For a shipping line, time at berth belongs to a voyage schedule. Fueling during cargo handling may avoid an additional stop or a separate period alongside, provided the transfer can be completed safely. The Antonia Maersk operation established that this coordination was possible at Busan; its 11-hour duration was not a measurement of time saved. Nor did the announced methanol quantity establish a carbon benefit. The port authority did not identify the fuel's production pathway.

By the time Busan Port Authority laid out plans in 2026 for a large fuel-storage complex to be completed by 2032, the first pieces of an alternative-fuel business were operating. The investment decision is no longer simply about making methanol or LNG bunkering possible. It concerns the next promise a port can make: that the right fuel will be available in the required quantity when a ship needs to leave.

The fuel does not have to begin in Busan

On August 8, 2024, the LNG delivered to the CMA CGM Visby at Busan New Port had come from Tongyeong. Korea Gas Corporation identified its Tongyeong receiving terminal as the loading point for the Blue Whale, the bunker vessel operated by its subsidiary Korea LNG Bunkering. The Blue Whale then sailed to Busan, where it supplied the container ship at the BNCT terminal while cargo was handled. Busan Port Authority recorded 270 tons transferred in roughly 14 hours; the gas company rounded the amount to about 300 tons.

Tongyeong held the fuel, the Blue Whale transported it, and Busan was the point of delivery. The system put LNG aboard a container ship without the large new storage facility now proposed for Busan. There is a cost to moving inventory this way, and a bunker vessel can serve only so many orders within a given period. The voyage proved that the arrangement works for a particular delivery, not that regional stock can meet every future request.

The next significant step came in February 2025. The Blue Whale delivered approximately 2,400 tons of LNG to the HMM Sky at Busan New Port's DGT terminal during container handling. Busan Port Authority presented the February 19–21 operation as the beginning of full commercial LNG bunkering alongside cargo work, following the previous year's demonstration. The announcement did not establish where this particular cargo had been loaded or how much the service provider earned. It did establish a commercial customer and a delivery far larger than the initial Visby transfer.

The same bunker vessel later appeared in announcements from both Ulsan and Busan involving the car carrier Daytona in 2026. Such operations illustrate the mobility of supply vessels across the southeast's ports. They do not prove that each load originated from one terminal or that the voyages were arranged under any particular cooperation agreement. In November 2023, Busan and Ulsan's port authorities had proposed closer cooperation over new marine fuels, linking Busan's container traffic with Ulsan's energy-handling capabilities. The actual Tongyeong-to-Busan journey is the clearer evidence of how a regional system can operate.

A port can therefore compete for bunkering customers without owning all the inventory within its boundaries. It needs dependable access to fuel, appropriate delivery craft, trained personnel and a berth where the work can take place. The distance to the storage tank matters because it affects replenishment time, cost and vulnerability to disruption. It does not determine, on its own, where the sale takes place.

LNG and methanol also require separate supply maps. Tongyeong is a documented LNG loading point for the 2024 Visbydelivery, not a proven source of the green methanol intended for Busan's future tanks. The liquids demand different handling systems, and a supplier's ability to provide one cannot be counted as capacity to provide the other. Their climate credentials differ even more sharply.

Ships create demand; their schedules decide where it lands

International contracts are beginning to secure fuel before some of the supporting port infrastructure is built. Hapag-Lloyd and Seaspan announced an approximately $120 million program in April 2024 to convert five 10,100-TEU container ships to methanol-capable dual-fuel propulsion. In November 2024, Hapag-Lloyd signed an agreement to purchase 250,000 tons of bio- and e-methanol a year from China's Goldwind. Its later financial reporting described an approximately 15-year arrangement covering about 3.8 million tons. The fuel producer's investment and the carriers' ship conversions are linked decisions, but neither constitutes investment in Busan's proposed terminal.

The October 2026 delivery to the Seaspan Amazon shows how the contracts reach an actual port. Goldwind produced certified biomethanol in China; Hapag-Lloyd arranged to use it on a converted vessel; the ship received fuel while operating at Busan. A production contract of 250,000 tons a year cannot be booked as 250,000 tons of future Busan traffic. Nor does the value of an international fuel purchase measure what a local bunker operator or terminal earns for handling it. Shipping routes, prices, fuel availability and the service available at each call will determine where portions of that contracted fuel are delivered.

The uneven early market makes the distinction important. Ulsan Port Authority reported methanol bunkering volumes of 2,000 tons in 2023 and 17,500 in 2024, followed by 830 in 2025. It recorded 784 tons in the first five months of 2026. The incomplete 2026 figure is not a full-year comparison, but the annual totals already show that the market has not grown in a straight line. The authority separately reported 20 methanol bunkering operations between July 2023 and April 2026. Operation counts and aggregate volume reveal activity without showing how many customers will return, how regularly they will buy or how much capacity they will reserve.

A few large transfers can account for much of a port's annual volume. Equally, a year with a modest total may contain difficult peaks in demand. A bunker operator can handle a sizeable, well-scheduled order yet struggle when two vessels require the same delivery craft at once. A liner customer may value a supplier that can guarantee a narrow fueling window more than one advertising a larger annual capacity. The relevant demand is therefore not just tons per year. It is tons of a specified fuel, at particular berths and times, with an agreed degree of certainty.

The shipping industry's own experience gives reason to resist assuming that every converted ship will choose a single favorite port. Research published in October 2026 by the Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller Center for Zero Carbon Shipping examined the operational experience of early methanol adopters. Its account describes fuel availability, established bunkering hubs and reliable operating procedures as practical constraints on vessel deployment. The early operating experience includes regular supply arrangements at established hubs as well as multi-port fueling on long routes. It cannot forecast Busan's sales. It does show why a carrier may prize a dependable supplier without surrendering its choice of where to buy.

What would the new tanks actually sell?

Busan Port Authority's plan, presented in May 2026 and subsequently included in revised national port planning, covers roughly 123,000 square meters in the southern hinterland of Busan New Port. It envisages LNG storage capacity of 370,000 cubic meters, green methanol storage of 150,000 cubic meters, and berths for vessels transporting and delivering the fuels. The target year is 2032. The port authority argues that stable access to alternative marine fuels will help Busan protect its position as a major container gateway. It has also said further appraisal and project-development steps are needed.

Keeping fuel near the berth could make service more resilient. A bunker vessel that must first load in another port is unavailable while it travels and replenishes. Bad weather, an equipment failure or another customer's order may cause delays. Local inventory, paired with suitable delivery vessels and berths, can shorten the response to an urgent request and offer more room to recover when a plan changes. It could also allow a supplier to commit fuel to a customer in advance rather than wait for an external shipment.

But a tank's capacity is a measure of the liquid it can hold at one time, not of fuel it will sell in a year. The same tank may turn over repeatedly or remain underused. Different fuels have different densities, storage conditions, handling costs and potential customer bases; the LNG and methanol capacities cannot simply be added into a single commercial throughput figure. Bigger tanks do not automatically mean a bigger bunkering market.

The more useful way to understand the proposed terminal is as a change in who carries the cost of uncertainty. Keeping fuel close to the berth requires capital, land, maintenance and financed inventory, some of which may sit idle. In return, ship operators may face fewer delays, suppliers may be able to guarantee delivery slots, and the port may become a more credible stop on a new-fuel route. A reliable reserve has value precisely because it may not be needed on an ordinary day.

The carrier receiving that protection and the company financing it may be different businesses. A shipping line may avoid a costly interruption without paying the storage operator the full value of the delay it escaped. The project needs a commercial route from readiness to income: handling charges, storage fees, reserved capacity, a premium for guaranteed delivery or another agreed form of payment. Customers can also seek similar protection from inventories elsewhere in the region, competing fuel sellers or changes to their own fueling schedules.

The decision is best tested against services that are actually interchangeable from the ship's perspective. One option is to continue drawing from regional inventories using mobile bunker vessels, as demonstrated by the Tongyeong route for LNG. Another is to hold larger quantities at Busan, closer to the berths. A third would combine regional stock with a smaller reserve near the port. Their costs cannot be compared sensibly until the fuel, order size, delivery deadline and required reliability are held constant. The answer may change when two ships demand fuel simultaneously or when coastal conditions prevent a bunker vessel from reaching Busan on time.

Busan's completed operations make both sides of the comparison credible. The Visby and HMM Sky received LNG without the proposed storage complex, so the existing regional system has demonstrated capability. Neither voyage proves that the same arrangement can satisfy a denser sequence of calls or a major disruption. Local inventory may close those gaps, but the return must justify its construction, operation, inventory financing and use of scarce port land. The question is not whether a tank is useful in the abstract. It is how much additional reliability a particular tank buys, compared with other ways of providing it, and what customers will pay for that difference.

Past plans and studies cannot settle the calculation. Government proposals in 2021 contemplated LNG bunkering facilities at both Busan and Ulsan. Regional cooperation was proposed in 2023; actual operations developed through other arrangements as well. Busan Port Authority commissioned broader commercialization work in 2025 that included fuel demand and financial appraisal. A separate academic input-output study estimated construction-related economic effects under an older LNG project concept. Such estimates describe potential activity associated with building infrastructure, not the operating cash flow or investment return of the 2032 LNG-and-methanol terminal. The public record explains the authority's supply-security rationale and the dimensions of its plan; it does not disclose the customer commitments and operating economics needed to establish a return.

The timing of the investment adds another risk. Shipping lines require fuel on the day of a scheduled call. Infrastructure owners must recover investment over years in which ship designs, fuel prices, production locations and regulations can all change. Building capacity before demand is established may attract customers who need confidence that fuel will be there. Building too much of the wrong capacity may leave expensive assets stranded. Staging investment can contain that risk, although it may also surrender the advantage of being ready early. Each choice purchases a different balance of flexibility, resilience and exposure.

The part of the trade that stays here

Fuel bought at Busan is not necessarily fuel made in Busan. The Seaspan Amazon received certified biomethanol sourced from Goldwind's Chinese production network. The cargo's value should not be confused with the value created by transporting, handling or verifying it in Korea. These are different transactions, often carried out by different firms.

Busan companies already perform some of the work behind the new fuel trade. Hyodong Shipping carried out the Antonia Maersk transfer. Korean Register developed safety procedures for the operation and has worked on methanol-bunkering simulation at its Busan headquarters. Bunker-vessel operation, terminal coordination, crew training, inspection and emergency planning are services for which the region can develop lasting expertise. Unlike a single fuel cargo, such capabilities can be used again, including when fuel production remains overseas.

Their value still has to be measured carefully. A bunkering invoice includes the price of the fuel itself, which may largely reflect production and trading outside Busan. A local company's sales are not the same as its value added after purchased inputs. A port's income from fees is different again. Even an expanding number of operations may support only limited local economic gains if most of the business is the resale of imported fuel. Conversely, skilled technical work and repeat marine services can have local value that a count of fuel tons scarcely captures.

The public sector has helped this market begin. Busan Port Authority offered relief from some port-facility charges for early demonstrations and helped coordinate safety arrangements. Removing a financial or procedural obstacle can make the first operation easier to attempt. What matters over time is whether demonstrations lead to customers who purchase the service without continuing to depend on the same support. The commercial HMM Sky LNG delivery in 2025 was a meaningful step beyond the preceding trial; its announcement does not establish the financial return on public assistance.

The measure of Busan's gain lies in the payments for delivery and specialized work, the investment supporting those services and the earnings retained locally. Multiplying bunker tonnage by an assumed fuel price would mostly describe gross trade. A successful terminal would need to deepen the services and expertise that remain after a ship sails, rather than merely enlarge the value of fuel passing through the port.

The carbon claim is another calculation

The ability to supply a fuel can generate business even when its climate value is disputed. LNG remains a fossil fuel. Its climate impact depends on emissions from production, transport and use, including methane released along the supply chain or left unburned by engines. A successful LNG transfer demonstrates a new service at the port; it says nothing by itself about the greenhouse gases avoided by the ship.

Methanol requires a different inquiry. Methanol made from fossil feedstocks is not interchangeable with biomethanol or e-methanol produced under specified low-emissions conditions. Even among fuels marketed as renewable, the feedstock, electricity source, production method and rules used to allocate certified attributes can change the lifecycle result. The word methanol on a bunker record is therefore a statement about the fuel's chemistry, not sufficient proof of its carbon intensity.

Ulsan provides a revealing example. In September 2025, the NYK-chartered bulk carrier Green Future took on approximately 830 tons of lower-carbon methanol there. In February 2026, NYK reported that using the fuel had reduced well-to-wake greenhouse-gas emissions by approximately 65 percent compared with conventional fuel on a voyage carrying copper concentrate for BHP. Well-to-wake includes emissions associated with producing, transporting and using the fuel. The percentage is the company's assessment for a particular shipping service, not a measured reduction in Ulsan Port's own emissions and not a result that can be assigned to every methanol delivery.

NYK said the fuel was ISCC EU-certified and its renewable attributes were accounted for using a mass-balance method. Such documentation is commercially significant. Shipping lines face growing demands to establish the origin and lifecycle characteristics of what they burn. The European Union's FuelEU Maritime requirements already affect covered ships, while the International Maritime Organization's proposed global Net-Zero Framework had not been adopted as of October 2026. Regulation can increase demand for particular fuels and credible records; it cannot guarantee that Busan will supply the next certified cargo.

A port able to combine safe transfer, dependable delivery and trustworthy fuel documentation may capture business beyond the simple sale of liquid. But the environmental benefit belongs to the fuel pathway and the vessel's use of it, not automatically to the port handling the transaction. The same discipline used to judge local economic value must apply to carbon claims: identify who performed the work, what was measured and where the claimed benefit belongs.

The commitment behind a promise

The ships are already arriving. Busan has transferred methanol beside active container terminals and received LNG from a supply vessel loaded in Tongyeong. The Seaspan Amazon has taken biomethanol in Shanghai and ISCC EU-certified biomethanol in Busan. International ship conversions and long-term fuel contracts are moving demand toward ports that can serve it. None of these developments waits for a terminal scheduled for 2032.

The existing network may nevertheless be too slow, fragile or constrained for a busier market. Local storage could let suppliers guarantee volumes and delivery windows they cannot confidently promise today. Nor does the existence of potential benefits settle the investment: if enough customers can obtain reliable fuel through a regional network or rival ports, the premium available to support new tanks may be thin.

Busan's next stage of competition will be decided in that space between being able to deliver fuel and being paid to keep it ready. Storage is only one part of the service; ships, crews, operating procedures, certification and customer commitments complete it. The port has shown that alternative fuels can reach its berths. What it has yet to establish publicly is how much more security local inventory would provide, for which customers, and on commercial terms capable of carrying the cost long after construction is finished.